

OCA FILE

18 May 1988
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STAT MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
ADC/ACIS

STAT FROM: [REDACTED]
Office of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: DoD Authorization Bill--Additional Arms
Control Reporting Provisions

The Senate has adopted an amendment to the FY89 DoD Authorization bill that would require a report to Congress on the relationship of the arms control objectives of the U.S. with the responsiveness of research and development of monitoring systems for weapons verification. A copy of the amendment, sponsored by Senator Domenici, is attached at Tab A.

The Senate has also adopted an amendment that would require the President to submit a report on Soviet anti-ballistic missile capabilities. A copy of the amendment is attached at Tab B.

In addition, the Senate has adopted an amendment prohibiting the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia or any other country possessing CSS-2 Chinese made missile unless the President certifies that Saudi Arabia or the other country does not have chemical, biological or nuclear warheads for such missile. A copy of the amendment is attached at Tab C.

STAT

[REDACTED]

If you have any objections to these amendments, please give me a call. I recognize that the last amendment may not be within your jurisdiction.

Attachments
as stated

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
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STAT OCA/Leg [REDACTED] pap (18 May 1988)



S 5432

CONGRESS

May 16, 1983

NOT VOTING—6

Biden
RockefellerStafford
Wallop

Wilson

So the motion to lay on the table amendment No. 2970 was rejected.

Mr. BUMPERS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may we have order? May we have order in the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senators will take their conversations, out of the well. Please cease audible conversations, so that we can hear the Senators seeking recognition.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas sought recognition. The Chair informs the Senator that under the previous order, the business before the Chamber is the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. BUMPERS. I yield.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we are working with the Senator from North Carolina and believe we will be able to get an amendment that will reflect a consensus, at least between the floor managers and the Senator from North Carolina, and I believe some members of the Foreign Relations Committee have been involved in that. I know that Senator Doan has. We are still working on that, so I suggest that we temporarily lay that aside, without losing its right in the turn, and take up either the Domenici amendment or the Bumpers amendment. I do not think either will take a lot of time, although I may be wrong.

Perhaps the Domenici amendment could be handled in about 4 or 5 minutes. If the Senator from Arkansas will agree with that, his amendment can be taken up right after that, and then we can go to the Helms amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas retains the floor.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to lay my amendment aside temporarily, in order to let the Senator from New Mexico offer his amendment, with the understanding that my amendment will be in order immediately after the disposition of that amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The Senate will be in order, so that we can hear Senators seeking recognition.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I will take 1 minute to comment on the vote. It was 68 to 27, which shows that an overwhelming number of Senators would like to vote on this issue, this

particular amendment. By Mr. D'AMATO.

I hope that between now and tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, with a 10-to-27 vote—which I do not believe is a totally accurate reflection of the opinion in this body, but is fairly close—we would have a chance to vote up or down on the D'Amato amendment.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, was the unanimous-consent agreement accepted?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous-consent agreement was accepted. No objection was heard.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, would it be possible to ascertain from the Senator from Arkansas or the Senator from New Mexico whether either or neither of these amendments will require a rollcall vote?

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, in answer to my colleague from Arkansas, I do not anticipate that at this time. I suppose something could go awry and it would require a rollcall.

Frankly, for the Members who are here, it is my present intention, based on the result of a colloquy between myself and the distinguished managers of the bill, to pull the amendment down after we debate it for a few moments.

Mr. PRYOR. I thank my colleague.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I do not think mine will require a rollcall.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I direct my question to the Senator from Georgia.

I have had a pending amendment on the Persian Gulf ready for a portion of Friday and all day today, requiring about 1 hour, equally divided. I have had assurances that that would be the next order of business at some point. But it is my understanding that the Senator from North Carolina is going to follow the Senator from Arkansas. Is that correct?

Mr. NUNN. I am sorry. I have been trying to carry on another conversation, and I apologize. Will the Senate restate the question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will suspend, let us try to achieve order, so that the Senator can be heard when he asks his question.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I direct my question to the floor manager. I have had a Persian Gulf resolution pending and notified him that it was going to be the order of business at some point during the day. It was agreed that 1 hour would be divided equally. In order to expedite the calendar, I want to be sure that the floor leader is aware of that and that it is somewhere in the offing, prior to 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator from Alaska that I am familiar with the amendment, but the amendment has not been agreed to. It will require debate, and I imagine that it will require a rollcall vote.

I suggest that the Senator not move very far from the Chamber, because we have three or four matters that

may not take very long; and perhaps within 30 or 35 minutes—say, around 5:30—we will be able to take up the Senator's amendment. I do not believe it is under a formal time agreement, although the Senator has offered 1 hour, and I hope we can stay within that.

I do not manage the order, and the Senator will have to get recognized. I suggest that he come back in the next 30 or 35 minutes and see if we can get the amendment up later the afternoon.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Senator.

AMENDMENT NO. 2967

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk, on behalf of myself and Senator BINGHAM, my colleague, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI), for himself and Mr. BINGHAM, proposes an amendment numbered 2967.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following new section:

SEC. . COORDINATION OF VERIFICATION POLICY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Not later than June 30, 1988, the President shall submit a report to the Congress which includes a review of the relationship of the arms control objectives of the United States with the responsiveness of research and development of monitoring systems for weapons verification. Such review shall include but not be limited to the participation of the Departments of Defense, State and Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

At a minimum, the report shall include the findings of the President, and such recommendations for improvement as the President shall deem appropriate, with respect to the following:

(a) the status of coordination in the formulation of U.S. arms control treaty verification policy;

(b) the status of efforts to ensure that arms control treaty verification policy is formulated in a manner which takes into account available technology for monitoring systems; and

(c) the status of efforts to insure that research and development on monitoring systems technology evolves in step with arms control treaty verification policy.

COORDINATION OF VERIFICATION POLICY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the most important principle of any arms control agreement is improving national security. But arms control agreements cannot contribute to national security unless they can be effectively verified.

If we cannot be sure that arms control treaties are being adhered to, we are, in fact, jeopardizing that security.

The critical role played by verification explains why the INF Treaty has been written into the INF Treaty. It has attracted a lot of attention.

That is also why the Senate has been unwilling to take up that treaty until all of the important verification provisions in the treaty have been agreed upon by both parties to the agreement.

The confusion surrounding the verification provisions of the INF Treaty makes it clear that we must not repeat the mistakes involved in the INF negotiation process.

The new interest in verification resulting from the signing of the INF Treaty has produced a new form of nuclear proliferation, a proliferation of Government offices with the word verification in their title.

I agree that verification research and development is more important now than it has ever been, and I'm sure all Members of the Senate agree that we need to do a better job in this critical area.

I am privileged to have within the borders of my State two organizations which have been at the forefront of verification research and technology for many years. I am speaking of the two national laboratories in New Mexico, at Sandia and Los Alamos.

I would recommend to my fellow Senators that they visit the DOE lab at Sandia and take a look at the perimeter portal monitoring system which was developed and set up there. This is the design which will be deployed in the Soviet Union to assist in monitoring the INF Treaty.

Some of the scientists at Sandia believe that the Soviets may even be interested in purchasing or borrowing this same state of the art verification technology.

I am in favor of verification research and development at the national laboratories and in other parts of the Government. But I am concerned that the effort is not well coordinated, especially as more resources are put into this area and more bureaucratic players get into the game.

I think that we are in danger of overdriving our headlights by letting the State Department's interest in arms control agreements outrun our abilities to verify those agreements.

Let me give an example of what we are up against here. Last January the Defense Science Board in the Pentagon established a task force to study the verification procedures for the START Treaty.

This task force, staffed by well qualified people, completed its report this month. I expect that it will make a valuable contribution to our ability to verify a START Treaty.

But I remind my colleagues that the State Department began negotiating a START agreement 6 years ago.

Yet, here we are, 6 years after we began negotiating a START agreement, undertaking a study to deter-

mine how we can best verify it. This is putting the arms control cart before the verification horse.

We must take steps now to insure that our arms control objectives are in line with our verification capabilities. And we must insure that we begin the verification research today for the arms control agreements which may be important to us in the future.

The amendment which I offer addresses this lack of coordination between our arms control intentions and our verification capabilities. It also seeks to minimize the confusion which may result from a mushrooming of new agencies all intent upon playing a role in the verification area.

This amendment requires the next President to carefully review our arms control objectives and to then determine what will be needed in order to verify the agreements which we will seek.

The President will also examine the coordination of our verification policy among the agencies involved in arms control and verification.

At a minimum, this review would require the participation of the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council.

The President would be asked to offer recommendations for improving policy coordination among these organizations and linking our treaty objectives to our verification capabilities.

The findings of the President's review would be reported to the Congress not later than June 30, 1989.

Mr. President, I think that the floor manager and the ranking member have seen this amendment and that they have no objection.

The Intelligence Committee might have some jurisdiction in this matter, and both the chairman and the ranking member have been advised of this amendment. I do not believe they have any objection.

Mr. President, the new interest in verification resulting from the signing of the INF Treaty has produced a new form of nuclear proliferation, a proliferation of Government offices with the word "verification" in their title.

Essentially, what the Senator from New Mexico is asking is that the President of the United States, by June 30 of next year, report and recommend to the Congress of the United States a method of centralizing the activities of verification and the science of verification and relate that to policymaking that will involve the need for verification and verification science and technology.

Some of us are beginning to worry that our arms control negotiations get ahead of our verification technology, or vice versa, or that there is such a proliferation of verification research and technology that there is no coordination as we move to understand

of verification.

Some of us are even concerned that policy is being made without knowing the extent to which verification technology has evolved, or the extent to which we will be unable to verify the agreements under negotiation.

This amendment is asking the President to look at it all and tell us how we ought to make more sense out of it and where it should be focused and where in the Government some body should be in charge of pulling it all together. That is essentially what it does.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think this is a good amendment.

The Senator is right, in the sense that we have to pull this verification together. We have to have more coordination.

It is not only part of the INF Treaty, but most of us concerned with the INF Treaty recognize that the reason it is important is that it is a precedent for other treaties that will be much more militarily significant than the INF Treaty—for example, START and the conventional arms discussions which are underway.

Although I have resisted reports and think we have too many of them, I think this is a very important report and will focus not only on Congress, when we receive it, but also the administration, as they prepare in this area.

I recommend that the amendment be accepted.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join the chairman in his remarks and commend our distinguished colleague from New Mexico.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the managers for their support.

I believe that this serves as a strong reminder to the executive branch that we should not find ourselves again in a situation where we have a treaty as important as the INF Treaty yet we find ourselves scurrying around to put together a team to do the verifying. We should not be in that position in the future.

For those who negotiate treaties, there should be one place where they can find out about the science of verification and where we are headed. We do not have that now.

I urge adoption of the amendment, and I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. NUNN. I yield back the time on this side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 2097) was agreed to.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. BUMPERS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

B

S 5552

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

May 12, 1988

tion's negotiators has now been done right.

We were told weeks ago that everything was hunky-dory, but we found that it was not the case. It is not the Senate's fault that it was not.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. President, I join with my colleague from Alaska and I want to state to him that I have said before to a number of my colleagues almost precisely what he said. I want him to know and my other colleagues who may not have heard my remarks that I was dismayed that this was not heard this last week. We want to have that treaty done and the Senate to act.

I am satisfied and I understand the position of the majority leader, but as was well stated by several of our colleagues, all of Europe could unravel if we do not ratify this treaty. We spent 6 months in hearings on this and we were disappointed, many of us on the committee, that it did not come up. I wanted that to be understood by the Senator from Alaska, by the Senators on the other side of the aisle, because the Senators on this side of the aisle have already heard me address that point.

I pray we do this Senate action prior to the end of this month and that we start on it next week, not to be rushed, not to do something inappropriate, but we have a duty and I hope this institution carries it out.

In a moment we are going to discuss another foreign policy issue, and I deeply believe that this institution should act on the foreign policy issues of the United States, and I pray we will ratify this treaty this month. I certainly will be one attempting to see that that happens, and I thank the President.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

The Senate continued with consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

AMENDMENT NO. 2029

(Purpose: To provide for a study and report on Soviet ABM capability and activities)

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Idaho [Mr. McCLURE] proposes an amendment numbered 2029.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 171 between lines 2 and 3, insert the following new section:

SEC. 924. STUDY AND REPORT ON SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY AND ACTIVITIES.

(a) STUDY REQUIRED.—(1) The President shall conduct a study regarding the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As a part of such study, the Secretary shall assess—

(A) the military capabilities and significance of the Soviet extensive network of large-phased array radars;

(B) whether the Soviet Government is illegally developing or producing mobile or transportable engagement radars;

(C) the Soviet ability to develop an effective exoatmospheric antiballistic missile defense without using widespread deployments of traditional engagement radars;

(D) the ability of Soviet air defense interceptors missiles now and in the future to successfully destroy ballistic missile warheads;

(E) whether Soviet silos or hardened facilities outside of the antiballistic missile site permitted near Moscow are or could be associated with illegal anti-ballistic missile defenses;

(F) whether the Soviet Government is developing terminal antiballistic missile defenses;

(G) whether the antiballistic missile site permitted near Moscow conceals or could conceal development, testing, or deployment of a widespread Soviet antiballistic missile system;

(H) Soviet activities regarding sea, land or air-based boost-phase intercepts of ballistic missiles;

(I) the status of Soviet laser, particle beam, and other advanced technology programs comparable to programs conducted by the United States under the Strategic Defense Initiative; and

(J) the consequences for the United States of a successful Soviet effort to acquire an effective nation-wide limited antiballistic missile system and the ability of the United States to respond to such effort.

(2) The assessment provided for in paragraph (1) shall include, but not be limited to, discussion of:

The ability of the United States to modify its existing strategic offensive forces including the use of penetration aids, and its strategic doctrine and tactics to effectively counter such a Soviet ABM system over the same period of time that the Soviets required to deploy it.

(b) PREPARATION OF REPORT.—The President shall prepare a report, in both a classified and an unclassified version—

(1) specifying the results of the study required by subsection (a); and

(2) containing such recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate, including recommendations with regard to maintaining the deterrent value of the strategic forces of the United States given the antiballistic missile capability and activities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(c) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—The President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President pro tempore of the Senate the report required by subsection (b) not later than October 1, 1989.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield for 1 minute?

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, might I dispose of this amendment? It is agreed upon. Thirty-five minutes ago I was assured I had a 4:30 appointment with the Senator for who is waiting for me.

It will only take me a very short while to dispose of the amendment.

I appreciate the Senator's courtesy in recognizing my problem.

Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on both sides of the aisle. I think it is acceptable to the managers. What it does is to try to solve one of the problems pending before this country at the present time with respect to what we face with respect to the ABM breakout capability of the Soviet Union.

The amendment calls for a study and a report back to the Congress and analysis of what that situation is so that the Congress can deal with that question without delaying the consideration of this bill at this time.

The report would be back to us by October 1 of next year, 1989. It is not a hurry-up proposal at all, but it will give the administration the time for thoughtful review, report back to us and analysis of what that situation is.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Idaho has been a leader in this body in bringing to our attention the scale of the Soviet strategic effort and implication for the United States security systems, and I recommend that we adopt this amendment.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, let me first express my appreciation for the cooperation of the distinguished Senators from Georgia and Virginia, the chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, in working with me on this amendment.

What the amendment does, in a nutshell, is require the President to report to the Congress on Soviet antiballistic missile activities and capabilities. This report would include recommendations on what steps may be necessary to maintain the deterrent value of United States strategic forces in the face of Soviet ABM capabilities.

Mr. President, earlier this year, many of us were extremely concerned to read that portions of the United States intelligence community now believe that the Soviet Union is breaking out of the ABM Treaty and deploying a strategic defense system. As my colleagues are well aware, the unilateral deployment of a missile defense by the Soviet Union would represent a seismic shift in the world's balance.

Let me make it clear that the intelligence analysts are divided on the question of Soviet ABM breakout. So far, the consensus judgment of the intelligence community is that the Soviets may be preparing to deploy a nationwide ABM defense, but have not broken out of the treaty at this time. Once again, however, there are some analysts who believe that the Soviet ABM breakout has already begun.

The purpose of this amendment is simply to put before the Senate, in one integrated report, the best information available on Soviet ABM capabilities. This is information we need if



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May 13, 1988

I believe that we have to be more imaginative in the retention of pilots. But I think, quite frankly, we have made progress. Effectively, what we are talking about is holding the ground at the present time.

Finally, on the question about commitment in the Indian Ocean, because this commitment is furthestest from the United States it is the most difficult to sustain, requiring nearly four carriers to maintain a year-round deployment. But other commitments are not as strenuous. For example, with a carrier based in Japan, it takes less than three to maintain a deployment.

In the Mediterranean, there is also a ratio of less than 3 to 1 to maintain a forward deployment. We find other parts where the aircraft carriers have a shorter time on the station. I think that the point that is made is that the average of 3 to 1 for carriers to forward deployments is sound. It has not been altered. It has not changed. We are maintaining that with our amendment. I hope that we would be successful.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, with the cooperation of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator's amendment be temporarily set aside so that we can go to two amendments, one agreed to by the distinguished Senator from Texas, and the other one that will be contentious and require a rollcall. May I have that unanimous consent?

Mr. BYRD. Reserving the right to object, what is the contentious amendment?

Mr. DIXON. May I say to the distinguished majority leader that the amendment that would be in dispute is one offered by the Senator from Texas requiring purchases of coal.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I would object to laying aside the amendment for that amendment.

Mr. DIXON. Then may I have unanimous consent to set aside the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts to take up an agreed-to amendment by the distinguished Senator from Texas that has been agreed to on both sides regarding Presidential certification of Saudi missiles?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Texas.

AMENDMENT NO. 2050

(Purpose: To prohibit arms sales to Saudi Arabia or any other nation that has procured CSS-2 Chinese-made missiles unless the President certifies that such nation does not have chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads for its CSS-2 missiles)

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Texas [Mr. GRAMM], for himself, Mr. LEVIN and Mr. NUNN, proposes an amendment numbered 2050.

On page 171, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following new section:

SEC. ____ RESTRICTION ON SALE OF ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND CERTAIN OTHER NATIONS

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no sale of arms may be made by the United States to Saudi Arabia or to any other nation in the Middle East which has procured CSS-2 Chinese-made missiles unless the President has first certified to Congress that Saudi Arabia or such other nation, as the case may be, does not have chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads for such missiles. A separate certification is required in the case of each proposed sale of arms and may not be made more than 90 days before the proposed sale is to be concluded.

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I submit this amendment on behalf of myself, Senator LEVIN and Senator NUNN.

Mr. President, the purchase by the Saudis of the CSS-2 Chinese missile, or East Wind missile, which is a surface-to-surface missile with a 1,600 mile range, is a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. I think it is imperative that we recognize that it is destabilizing; that we recognize that this is not something which will promote stability in the Middle East; and that, finally, we make it clear that, since this missile is capable of carrying chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads, we want a certification that the Saudis do not have such capacity, that they are not intent on getting such capacity, and that any time we are debating an arms sale to Saudi Arabia or any other country in the Middle East that has acquired this missile, we want certification that they do not have the capacity to put chemical, biological or nuclear warheads on their East Wind missiles.

Mr. President, let me also make it clear that while the Saudis continue to state that their objective in acquiring this missile, a missile that was acquired without our knowledge, is to protect themselves from the Iranians, I want to draw the attention of my colleagues to a menacing editorial cartoon which appeared in the Saudi newspaper Al Jaziraj.

This is a newspaper that is at least influenced, if not controlled, by the Saudi Government. It has a cartoon that depicts an East Wind missile. From this missile an easterly wind is flowing over a menorah which has the Star of David on it.

I think it is important that we note that while the Saudis talk about Iran, the newspapers that they influence, if not control, draw such cartoons. I think it is imperative that the Saudis understand that if such an East Wind ever blows, it will reap a hurricane, not only from Israel, but from the United States.

So I think this is an important amendment. I am delighted that it is supported on both sides of the aisle. I think it sends a very clear signal.

Obviously, if we are going to have stability in the Middle East we cannot have more missiles that are chemical, biological, or nuclear capable.

I would like to note also that the Saudis did sign the chemical and biological accords of 1971, committing not to proliferate in this area. All this amendment does, in terms of those two important and dangerous weapons, is to commit them through procuring by the United States, to an agreement they have already reached; and, in addition, includes nuclear weapons.

So I thank my colleagues for accepting the amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this is a simple but important proposal. I know that the Members of this body were as shocked as I was when we learned that the Government of Saudi Arabia had secretly procured CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China. I joined with a majority of my colleagues in sending a letter to the Secretary of State protesting this introduction of a major offensive weapons system into the Middle East and urging that any United States plans to sell weapons to the Saudis be reexamined in light of this development.

In the wake of this very disturbing event, the Saudis pledged that they would not acquire nuclear or CBW warheads for these missiles. This amendment would simply require the Secretary of State to certify to the Congress before proposing any future arms sales to the Saudis or any other country in the Middle East which acquires this type of missile that they have not been equipped with nuclear or CBW warheads. The amendment does not remove any of the other reporting or approval requirements for foreign military sales, and it is not meant to imply that the Congress approves of the deployment of this type of missile system in the region. I continue to believe that the acquisition of these missiles was a dangerous and destabilizing move by the Saudis. I hope they can be persuaded to pursue their security objectives in less threatening ways in the future.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. President, in his usual careful manner the Senator has addressed a very serious problem. The destabilizing nature of the Saudi missiles would be greatly magnified if they were equipped with chemical, biological or radiological weapons, and the United States should exert maximum pressure on Saudi Arabia to prevent such a development.

This side is pleased to support the distinguished Senator from Texas and the distinguished Senator from Michigan in this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?